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The Islamization of Turkey has been an ongoing process since the 1970s and
was exacerbated by the 1980 military coup. The Turkish-Islamic synthesis had been
conceived as an antidote against communism and became a salient policy. The atmosphere
became increasingly convenient for Islamists to participate in politics as well as in socio-










monopolizes foreign relations, which result in diplomatic scandals and cause people to ask
whether Turkey is changing direction. Counterbalancing forces remain confrontational.
Paradigm shifts in practicing politics are sorely needed.
 
Since the promulgation of the Republic, Turkey’s Grand National Assembly meeting
hall carries the maxim “Sovereignty Belongs to the People—Unconditionally and
without Reservation” on its wall. Fifty years hence, from the 1970s onward, some
radical parliamentarians who belonged to the myriad religiously-oriented parties that
Necmettin Erbakan established voiced a different motto, that “Sovereignty Belongs
to God.” Erbakan’s parties, however, were never able to change the previous maxim.
These parties were periodically closed on orders of the Constitutional Court for




In 2001, a group of younger “reformists” from Erbakan’s entourage split from the
“traditionalists” and formed the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma
Partisi, AKP). Nobody from the AKP suggests publicly that sovereignty belongs to
God. Instead, the AKP’s leaders, along with their families, pose as role models, use
material incentives to attract adherents, confine civilian bureaucratic promotions to








 to spread the “Islamic way of
life” in society. This social endeavor, among other means—political, economic, and
financial—is called conservative democracy in the AKP’s parlance. Social policy is
primarily based on charitable acts whereby government aid is distributed to the poor
in kind as well as in cash.
Since 2002, AKP is not only the majority party in the parliament, but it also
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Turkish people (in the 2007 national elections, the AKP won by 46 percent of the
votes, although this number receded to 36 percent in the local elections of 2009).
Either way, the majority in the AKP’s sense of the term ignores the 53 percent who
did not vote for them. Secondly, contemporary democracies are consensual, not
majoritarian. The AKP’s position is rather peculiar for a party that claims to want
European Union (EU) membership for Turkey. Moreover, the AKP’s leader, Recep
Tayyip Erdo
 
[GBREV] an, displays autocratic behavior as prime minister, in speech and atti-
tude towards whomever is critical of policies or the state of the economy. Last but





an defines himself with religious reference points in his personal
worldview and as economically liberal and communitarian-liberal, and as a









an as saying, in 2004: 
Let me be quite open and clear in stating a fact—we don’t find it appropriate
to mix religion and politics…. We are not Muslim democrats, we are conser-
vative democrats. Some in the West portray us as [Muslim democrats] but our
notion of conservative democracy is to attach ourselves to the customs and the
traditions and the values of our society, which is based on family. This is a




The terms are confusing because a conservative stance about family values is a
personal as well as a political choice, especially in a patriarchal society like Turkey.
It has nothing to do with democratic outlook. Haphazard notions at the highest level
of government do not help confidence-building among the opposition or between
state institutions.
Populist approaches to foreign relations further raise questions about Turkey’s
international identity. Counterbalancing forces, mainly the opposition parties, are not
acting responsibly either. The culture of political opposition in Turkey has always
been confrontational and bitter instead of constructive. The result is polarization
between the secularists and government because the political agenda is filled with
irrelevant issues. Political scientist Fuat Keyman urges a paradigm shift in politics
because both the government and opposition are captive to their own paradigms. As
Keyman noted: “Instead of working to solve real problems, Turkey’s political agenda
is filled with futile debates regarding military coups and military jurisdiction,




What is of concern for the purposes of this study is not the Islamization of Turkey
under the AKP per se but the Arabization of Turkey. This is done through switching
cultural norms, control of women’s attire in the name of religion, and new architec-
ture styled after arabesque aesthetics for the conservative nouveau riche. More
important, perhaps, is the shift in foreign relations, where the government is
blatantly taking sides with Islamists.
The first part of this study dwells on the changing domestic and world conjunctures
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deliberate moves to radically alter the social texture and value systems. Further, the
AKP’s challenge toward altering checks and balances at the political level is
discussed. The second part discusses the Fethullah Gülen Movement (FGM), which
works as a global Muslim missionary system and so far seems to back the AKP
domestically. The third part focuses on diplomatic scandals that have been tainting
the country’s prestige at the international level and departure from the traditional
Republican code of conduct. The article concludes that such behavior was not exactly
what the Turks or the international community expected of AKP rule. Instead, people
expected that a majority party rule would lead Turkey to good governance, as the
government would not be hampered by bickering coalition partners, provided, and as
promised, that the ruling party seeks consensus. Populist and chauvinistic approaches
to politics, domestic and foreign alike, killed that expectation in many quarters.
In 2006, this author wrote: 
Both international and domestic systemic changes (defined as globalization and
integration to the EU) may (but not necessarily) be in the process of transforming
the AKP to become a mainstream “conservative democrat” party just as it defined




 AKP’s claim to mainstream politics was
received with suspicion in many quarters, given that its leaders had been involved
in political Islam in the past. The current conjuncture presents an invaluable
opportunity to AKP to institutionalize for longevity and entrench itself as a right
of center party. However, it has become yet another “leader’s party” just like
many other Turkish parties which were reduced to obscurity once the leader was
gone…. AKP’s representative profile affects foreign relations…the AKP lead-
ership reverts to its narrow worldview upon occasion, confusing legality, legit-
imacy, and personal piety. Although such behavior does not affect foreign/
security policy directly, it none the less presents difficulties in representation




During the interim, AKP leaders, plausibly encouraged by the 46 percent of the
national vote they received in the 2007 elections, have accelerated dismantling
the Republic’s code of conduct in statecraft—in the name of populism. However,
the AKP did not just happen upon Turkey. Its rise was the culmination of the defen-
sive reflex against any shade or dose of the left by the establishment since the 1950s




s and religious orientation as an antidote against
socialism. This trend was already named the Turkish-Islamic synthesis in the 1970s.
In an ironic way, Erbakan’s numerous parties as well as AKP are collateral damages
of the Cold War in Turkey. It is well worth treading briefly the sociopolitical path in








 like the Naqshibandi and a relatively new








































s and the Republican decision-making elite that as long as the
former remained behind the political scene, they would even serve as useful in
sustaining the status quo against any challenge from the left. It was not a coincidence
that Erbakan’s first Islamist party was formed one year before the 1971 military coup.
It was noteworthy that Air Force General Muhsin Batur was sent to Switzerland,





Islam was empowered especially after the 1980 military coup, though the Islamists
are not a homogenous body because they tend to split into many communities. These













s also cultivated women, albeit separately from men, and as such created a
stratum of Islamist women. Women thus began to address socioeconomic and polit-
ical problems within the framework of religion. Imam and preacher high schools
became a venue through which many Islamist women qualified to study at universi-
ties. They were now in the public sphere and soon began to demand positions in




 at universities erupted in 2003-
2004. Both Turkey’s Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) ruled that religious symbols in the public service sphere were against the
principle of secularism. Then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül and his wife
Hayrinüssa Gül also brought the State of Turkey to court at the ECHR because she





withdrew their case when the ECHR upheld the ruling of Turkey’s Constitutional
Court in other cases. While this conduct may be interpreted as an act of dismantling,
it may also shed some light as to why Gül’s presidential candidacy became so
controversial.
The AKP promotes Islamist women’s political activism at the grassroots. At the
same time, out of the 49 female parliamentarians, 30 are from the AKP, including
the female minister of education. In short, the Islamization of women is a very




 Among political parties in
Turkey, the AKP is the only one which has women’s commissions organized
nationwide.
Turkish-Islamic synthesis became state policy in the aftermath of the September
12, 1980 coup. The understanding or accommodation between the generals of 1980
and the Islamists made strange bedfellows and deepened the rift between secularists
and Islamists at all levels of the state apparatus as well as society. It is plausible that
this Janus-like system was employed to coopt the Islamists into the mainstream and
provide space for them in the management of the country. The Nationalist Action





Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) has been vacillating in
its discourse in catering to “Islamic values.” Since 1980, Islamists professionally
entrenched themselves in all state institutions. Hence, theirs is not a frontal attack
but a siege policy to employ Islamist cadres in state institutions, dismantle checks
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Islamic republic. When people speak of coups d’etat in Turkey they invariably refer
to the military kind of coups. However, civilian coups, in the name of further




 Dismantling operations take time,
and the Islamists probably think that time is on their side.
The election of Abdullah Gül, an ardent Islamist, as president was one of the first
coups against the principle of checks and balances. As of 2009, both the chief
executive (the prime minister) and the president were members of the AKP. The
president holds significant powers in appointing members of the Constitutional





 Even in coalition governments political parties vie for the ministries of
justice and interior, which has serious implications for controlling the domestic
security apparatus as well as the justice system. More often than not, such control
becomes a viable tool to be used against the opposition. This was exactly the
method used by communists in Central and Eastern Europe in 1945–1946 to trans-
form Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria into communist states. Whether a single
political party, though in the majority, can successfully impose regime change in
Turkey is very doubtful. That process would require dictatorial powers coupled with
serious support from abroad. In the short and medium terms neither option is feasi-










are critical of his performance. The prime minister asks publicly that people boycott
these newspapers. He has no tolerance for caricatures or satire and often takes
writers or caricaturists to court. Furthermore, he can be verbally abusive of common
people as well as journalists. Perhaps all these reactions stem from the prime
minister’s populist and direct style as well as an extremely emotional temperament.
However, nowhere in the world would the following episode cause such contro-
versy had there been confidence in the AKP’s leader.
At the end of June 2009, the prime minister was a guest at the commemoration
ceremony of the police force where he stated that the police were the protectors of
the regime. While some opinion-makers thought there was nothing wrong with this





 The internal security forces have not been institutionalized
professionally and are dominated by pro-Fethullah cadres. In sum, normalization of
democracy and elite consensus is still lacking in an environment where the govern-
ment, armed forces, political parties, judiciary, intellectuals, and universities are
split between the forces of dissonance, means of service to the country, or to an
omnipresent and omnipotent entity. This brings us to the powerful and global
Muslim missionary movement headed by a former preacher, Fethullah Gülen. The
disciples of Fethullah became an important source of dissonance on the path to the
Islamization of Turkish society. Their impact is not only being observed in Turkey
but as a global movement; at least some countries are beginning to question the
mission where Fethullah schools have spread. On the contrary, a European sociolo-
gist may view the FGM only as a socioreligious formation, intent on helping






































The Fethullah Gülen Movement: A Fifth Column or a Humanitarian Mission?
 
There are two major but complementary viewpoints about the movement. One is a
sociological academic approach that tries to understand the FGM phenomenon but





other approach evaluates the FGM from a political perspective based on preparing









 Secular conglomerates have had a dominant position in Turkey. 
Never before, though, has a single individual started a movement that seeks to
transform Turkish society so fundamentally. Gülen now wields a vocal partisan
media; a vast network of loyal bureaucrats; partisan universities and academia;
partisan prosecutors and judges; partisan security and intelligence agencies;
partisan capitalists, business associations; NGOs, and labor unions; and parti-




Gülen’s ultimate objective can be found in his sermons of 1999 when some Turkish
TV channels aired the video clips. There he cautioned his followers to wait until the
time is ripe to make a forward move; otherwise, they would be crushed like in
Algiers, Syria, and Egypt. Meanwhile, adherents were told to “move in the arteries





 However, it is impossible not to notice.
Male doctors who refuse to treat women and female doctors who refuse to treat
men, university students who cannot look at a female academician in the eye, fine
arts students who refuse to study nude bodies, medical students who do not attend
anatomy classes, mayors who remove statues and statuettes from public parks or
close down girls’ volleyball teams, governors who preach gender-segregated
schools, and medical doctors who appear on TV shows and declare that cancer can




s no longer employ
dissimulation.
It is not clear how many Gülen schools there are, in Turkey or abroad, because
other schools are supplied with adherents through cramming schools into national




















 TV). The movement is sponsored by “conservative”





 (Asia Finance). Fatih University in Istanbul and Virginia Interna-





 Fethullah Gülen lives in Pennsylvania, where he first settled for the purpose
of medical treatment for diabetes, and he recently obtained permanent residency
status. What is surprising is that the US court did not even question the false
pretense of diabetes, which is a treatable disease almost everywhere around the
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States by fleeing a pending court case. Turkey’s Supreme Court upheld his acquittal




 The verdict conveniently removed the accu-
sation made by the top prosecutor against President Gül during debates in the
Constitutional Court about closing down the AKP. Gül was accused of sending
directives to all Turkish embassies abroad, when he was Minister of Foreign Affairs,
to cultivate good relations with FGM schools around the world. 
Here in the US the FGC [Fethullah Gülen Community] runs over 90 charter
public schools in at least 20 states…. Indeed, the fact that so little has been writ-
ten about the FGC schools here in the US, as well as the accolades that have
been accorded the FGC as a model of “moderation” by some in our government
would appear to confirm that the FGC and its schools are doing an excellent
job of heading Gulen’s exhortation [“move in the system without anyone notic-





The message of tolerance and interfaith dialogue that FGM transmits is made for
international consumption at this conjuncture where the West, and especially the
US, is keen on promoting “friends of Muslims” image in the fight against interna-
tional terrorism. Sharon-Krespin concludes: 
What Turkey’s Islamists really want is to remove the founding principles of the
Turkish Republic. So long as US and Western officials fail to recognize that
Gülen’s rhetoric of tolerance is only skin-deep, they may be setting the stage
for a dialogue, albeit not of religious tolerance, but rather to find an answer to




Dismantling operations, just like in the case of terrorism, require international
support. This may be an interesting case study onto itself. Suffice it to say that FGM
power projection towards Turks in the US may be one thing, but if that projection is
extended to other American Muslims, that will be an entirely different story. The
main concern in FGM is not the state of Islam but the establishment of an Islamic
state. It is noteworthy, however, that in the fourteenth century one of the greatest
Muslim philosophers, Ibn al-Khaldun, had argued that there had not been an Islamic
state after the Muhammad and the four caliphs. Other Muslim state formations were




At this point in time, FGM represents a struggle to control the public sphere,
mainly through women’s minds and bodies, because this is the most visible venue.
Marriage patterns in the community are also between members and are dictated by
the older brothers and sisters in charge of groups. There are indeed some young




 mainly for psychological reasons,
piety, and respectability. However, many are forced into it by their male relatives or
in FGM communities as small children. Female dermatologists and orthopedists tell







































 This situation cannot be explained as free-
dom of choice or human rights. Iranian-French writer Djavann wrote that: 
it is inappropriate to probe the motivations of every young girl wearing the veil
when what is at stake is a political agenda…. Islam can exist without the veil,
but the Islamist system cannot, because the veil is the symbol, the flag and the




Even if one looks at FGM only as a social phenomenon, it still appears as a social
engineering design. It may be akin to the Protestant missionary movement of the
nineteenth century, yet the latter had no claim on state power. FGM’s humanitarian
discourse and activities and its emphasis on tolerance and interfaith dialogue seem
innocent. However, there is no question about its impact on the Islamization of the
Turkish society. This resonates on the relationship between the ruling party and
secularists. According to a reliable public opinion pollster, the number of people




 The AKP leadership,
based on its majoritarian hubris, has done nothing to dispel suspicions even though
some suspicions may be based on conspiracy theory. David Ghanim wrote: 
It [AKP] is the first experience that considers the heritage of the past to be no
hinderance to a positive engagement with the future. In power, the AKP has
proven, so far at any rate, that there is no hidden agenda to Islamize Turkish





Parallel to Ghanim, Yılmaz argued that allowing space to Islamists in politics is a




 On the contrary, Bassam Tibi wrote: 
Too many in the West praise the AKP as “ moderate Islamic.” The only differ-
ence, however, between moderate and jihadist Islamists is the use of the ballot
box instead of violence to come to power. It may be important to include Islam-














s, FGM, and the government not
only is Turkey’s social texture is dismantled, the traditional diplomatic code of conduct
and statecraft are also upset. This is reflected in the international relations format
through diplomatic scandals (discussed below) caused by the leaders’ behavior.
 
Populist Approaches to Foreign Relations
 
Between 2003 and 2008, many op-eds, policy papers, and scholarly articles were
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the Ankara parliament did not pass the resolution to accommodate American troops
on Turkish territory for the purpose of a northern attack on Iraq. All the literature
dwelled on strategy, tactics, political implications, and the bitterness this incident
caused in relations. This study assesses the situation from a diplomatic point of view.
In 2002, before Erdo
 
[GBREV] an held portfolio as prime minister he made encouraging
but premature promises to President George W. Bush during a visit to the White
House about US troop deployments on Turkey’s territory to facilitate America’s
impending war on Iraq. This backfired, to the detriment of relations between the two
countries. While Erdo
 
[GBREV] an may have relied on the AKP’s majority in the parliament,
he was ignorant of historical precedence. Despite alliances, the Republican state had
never become a conduit for war against any neighbor, unless an operation was
clearly undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations, as had been the case in
the Gulf War of 1991.
The resolution to allow US troop deployment in Turkey was rejected by a thin
margin in parliament on March 1, 2003. Out of the 533 members of parliament who
voted, 250 voted against, 264 in favor, and 19 were undecided. Bülent Arınç,
speaker of parliament, resorted to Article 96 of the Constitution, which called for the
absolute majority of votes by those present. According to simple calculation, abso-
lute majority had to be 266, but the yes votes were two short of the required number.
None of the members of parliament, who voted affirmatively out of partisan loyalty
to the leader, opposed Arınç.
The “failure” to pass the bill resulted in recriminatory and at times a vituperative









an managed to cause a diplomatic scandal by misleading
Washington. Nescience, combined with misplaced advice, was very costly to the
credibility and respectability of the state. However, this point was lost during the
heat of war.





Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen were scheduled to hold a press conference.





an walked out in protest, thus embarrassing his host as well as becoming a















an became totally convinced that people in Turkey liked
his bullying behavior as a tough man of the people. That should not be taken for
granted when put against the test of Turkey’s image and prestige, concepts taught in
courses on foreign relations to be among the most cherished principles of national
interest and foreign policy conduct. However, perhaps “national interest” is redun-
dant in this context, considering that worldviews are based on the community of
Muslims, not on the nation per se.
Islamization of international behavior also increased. In July 2008, the AKP
government hosted Sudan’s president, Omar al-Bashir, the “butcher of Sudan,”















































as 3 million people who fled their homes. Investment opportunities on Sudanese oil
had priority.
When King Abdullah ibn Abd al-Aziz al-Saud visited Turkey in November
2008, it was only normal to extend royal protocol. However, both the president
and prime minister paid him the first visit at Swiss Hotel in Ankara when diplo-
matic protocol calls for it to be the other way around. When criticized that this was
not the proper state conduct, Gül and Erdo
 
[GBREV] an stated that they did this out of




 It is not clear whether the king returned the visit; he
practically held court at the hotel. In 2007, during the king’s prior visit, the femi-
nist Flying Broom news site had criticized AKP leadership of extending him royal
protocol under the headline, “The King from the Country where Women are




On March 2, 2009, the Davos World Economic Forum scandal followed in the




an who had piously
respected old age in the case of the Saudi king shouted insults at Israel’s President




an walked out of the televised
meeting in anger, vowing never to return to Davos. It took just one week for Arab
countries like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt to publicly announce through their
foreign ministers that third parties should keep out of the process of normalization




The last, but not least, of the diplomatic scandals revolved around Anders Fogh
Rasmussen’s candidacy as NATO general secretary. In April 2009, and in total defi-
ance of the Alliance, Turkey’s prime minister threatened to veto Rasmussen, who




an’s unfavorable attitude towards
Rasmussen was based on the fact that he had not apologized for some caricatures in
a Danish newspaper allegedly insulting Muhammad, as well as for not having done
anything about the pro-PKK Roj TV.36 For the Danish prime minister, the former
issue was about freedom of expression. The latter exceeded his authority and was a
matter for the Danish courts. Nonetheless, following a long diplomatic conference
call with US President Barack Obama and European leaders, Erdo[GBREV] an abandoned
his show of force but declared that Turkey was given some concessions in both
matters. This, of course, was not the case.37 An equally significant point was that
Erdo[GBREV] an claimed to have received many calls from Islamic countries urging him to
veto Rasmussen.38 If that is the case, then one would seriously question whether the
prime minister is a spokesman on behalf of the Islamic countries or chief executive
of the Republic of Turkey.
In 2007, the AKP defined its foreign policy as proactive.39 However, since
foreign policy has been monopolized by the prime minister it has become increas-
ingly reactive. Articles written by retired ambassadors urging fine-tuning in foreign
policy behavior are to no avail.40 In April 2009, a Financial Times editorial advised
Turkey’s government to keep to calm and quiet diplomacy. It argued that the sharp
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Conclusions
Conclusions to be derived from the foregoing are manifold. Starting with the issue
of populist approaches to foreign relations, foreign policy analysts increasingly refer
to the AKP’s foreign policy, not to Turkey’s foreign policy.42 This is disturbing in
more ways than one. In the first place, it raises the question of whether the party and
state are viewed as one. If so, the situation has dire consequences for the state of
democracy in Turkey. Secondly, it is unrealistic as well as destructive to abandon
the traditional codes of conduct and protocol in foreign relations because there is no
room for sentimental populism in the international arena. The repercussion is loss of
prestige. Third, meeting with radical factions in the Middle East and flaunting this
publicly is not conducive to peace-building.43 It alienates both the major Arab coun-
tries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan as well as Israel. Finally, the Turkish
prime minister’s sharp tone about the Gaza war and the AKP’s active anti-Jewish
propaganda had domestic repercussions against Turkish Jews. The billboards put up
by the AKP in Istanbul with anti-Semitic slogans, the cartoon exhibit put up in
Istanbul’s Taksim metro station—the most central artery of the city’s public trans-
portation system—and the prime minister’s scolding of Peres seriously disturbed the
tiny Jewish community of Istanbul. Islamists had definitely blurred the distinction
between Turkey’s Jews and the state of Israel. Only after public appeals to the prime
minister by Jewish organizations in the US and by prominent Turkish-Jewish busi-
nessmen did the outrageous discourse and protests calm down. The prime minister
vowed to fight anti-Semitism in Turkey.44 It remains unclear as to what is being
done about this issue.
As for the Islamization of Turkish society under the tariqats and FGM’s mission-
ary activities, Islamists may ask what is wrong with their religious teachings and
spreading the virtues of an Islamic way of life. The repercussions, however, appear
to be instilling political Islamism, Talibanesque worldviews,45 and increasing xeno-
phobia, racism, and women-hatred, which go hand in hand with increased social
conservatism in Turkey attested to by polls and academic surveys. In July 2007,
interviews of 1,715 people conducted by Professor Yılmaz Esmer in 33 provinces
revealed that 29 percent favor the implementation of Shari’a law, including not only
curbing women’s legal rights but also stoning to death in cases of adultery.46 The
current substitute for the latter is increased violence against women as well as
“honor” killings. It may be of some consolation that percentages on this issue fell
from 38 percent in 1999 by a factor of 9 percent in 2007.
Binnaz Toprak’s study on social conservatism revealed that while the political
and legal systems in Turkey will remain secular, society faced Islamization. This
resulted in all forms of pressure and discrimination against secular women, espe-
cially outside of the three large cities of Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir. Another signif-
icant point in Toprak’s study was that people were forced to behave conservatively
in order to be promoted or awarded government contracts. Therefore, what is on the
rise is not religiosity but social conservatism.47 Another sociopolitical factor in
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are caught between liberals, nationalists, and Islamists, who are engaged in a vicious
struggle to dominate.48
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Republic, was successful in making a
social revolution by changing the value systems of the Ottoman society because he
instilled pride in his people.49 For Atatürk, statesmanship was a well-studied form of
art; leadership was not just about merely being a politician. Attempts to alter the
value systems of an entire nation have two major characteristics; moral authority and
instilling pride. Otherwise, religiously oriented oppression and worldviews backfire
sooner than later. The AKP’s identity crisis of late, between Islamism and conserva-
tive democracy, will be remembered as a waste of time and energy for Turkey
because the chances of being reelected as a majority party are increasingly slim, and
Turkey’s European vocation is becoming more questionable under the AKP govern-
ment at a time when there is once again more enthusiasm among the people for
membership in the European Union. A major problem with the AKP is that it is trying
to be everything to everybody both domestically and internationally, resulting in loss
of confidence even in circles that once had confidence in the party. Counterbalancing
forces in the ruling party and outside need to be constructively vigilant.
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ğ
ğ
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